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Case No. 20170552 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
TODD MULLINER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves an illegal sentence that the State agrees needs to 
be corrected. The parties disagree only as to how it should be corrected. 
Nearly two decades ago, Mulliner pleaded no contest to second-
degree-felony theft by deception in St. George and was sentenced to 1-15 
years in prison (St. George Sentence). Mulliner later pleaded guilty to third-
degree-felony sale of an unregistered security (Count 1) and third-degree 
felony securities fraud (Count 2) and received 0-5 years for each Count. 
To date three judges have considered how Counts 1 and 2 relate to the 
St. George Sentence - the original sentencing judge, and a second and third 
judge who considered Mulliner' s first and second motions to correct an illegal 
sentence. Notably, all three judges required Count 2 to be served consecutive 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to Mulliner' s St. George Sentence with the intent of adding five years to his 
maximum sentence and thereby holding him separately accountable for his 
new crimes. Although it is lawful to run Count 2 consecutive to the St. George 
Sentence, for various reasons, none of the three judges' attempts to do so here 
resulted in a legal sentence. 
Mulliner now asks this Court to do what the three judges lawfully 
refused to: eliminate his separate accountability by running Counts 1 and 2 
concurrent with his St. George Sentence, thereby reducing his maximum 
sentence by five years. 
This Court should refuse Mulliner' s request for two reasons. First, as 
stated, his request is conh·a1y to the intent of three different judges who 
demanded separate accountability for Mulliner's crimes. And second, 
because Mulliner' s sentence is illegal, it is void. This Court should not 
therefore correct the sentence at all. Rather, the case should be remanded to 
the trial court for resentencing. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is Mulliner's sentence illegal where it requires that the sentence for 
Count 2 run consecutive to both Count 1 (from March 2009 to March 2014) 
and the St. George Sentence (from July 2018 to July 2023)? 
-2-
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Standard of Review. The State concedes that the sentence is illegal and 
that this case should be remanded for resentencing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
Mulliner fails two chances at probation 
More than seventeen years ago, Mulliner pleaded no contest to three 
second-degree, fraud-related felonies in St. George and was sentenced to 1-
to-15 years in prison but given a chance at probation (St. George Sentence). 
R54-55, 297-99.1 While on probation, Mulliner committed several new fraud-
related crimes and his probation was revoked and reinstated. R297-301. 
Shortly thereafter, Mulliner again committed multiple new fraud-related 
crimes, including the sale of an unregistered security (Count 1) and securities 
fraud (Count 2), both third-degree felonies. Rl-2, 6-7.2 This time the court 
revoked Mulliner' s probation and sentenced him to serve his 1-to-15-year 
prison sentence. R54-55, 296-301. While in prison, Mulliner pleaded no 
contest to both Counts 1 and 2. R20-31. 
1 The Fifth Judicial District Court case number is 991500379. The 
docket shows that Mulliner pleaded no contest to theft by deception, 
communications fraud, and unlawful use of a financial card. 
2 Mulliner was charged with six, third-degree felonies in this case, but 
pleaded no contest to two of them and the remaining charges were dismissed. 
Rl-2, 15. 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mulliner' s original sentence (first judge) 
The first judge sentenced Mulliner to 0-5 years for each count (Counts 
1 and 2). R44-49. It ordered Count 1 to run concurrent with the St. George 
Sentence and Cow1t 2 to run consecutive to the St. George Sentence. Id. The 
first judge ran Count 2 consecutive to the St. George Sentence to ensure that 
Mulliner have "some modicum of separate accountability" for his new 
crin1es. R45-46. But the first judge's sentencing order did not state whether 
Counts 1 and 2 were consecutive or concurrent to each other. Id. Below is a 
visual illustration of Mulliner' s original sentence: 
Illustration #1 (Mulliner's original sentence) 
July 2, 2003 
l 
I 
March 17, 2004 March 16, 2009 
July 1, 2018 July 1, 2023 
l 
Count 2 (0-5 years) 
Mull-iner fails two chances at parole 
Within three years, Mulliner was paroled. R55. But he continued 
committing fraud-related crimes. R55-57. He pleaded guilty to issuing a bad 
check (case no. 081700944), two charges of theft by deception (case nos. 
081403492 and 091400160), and went back to prison. Id. He appears to have 
-4-
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received another chance at parole but, again, continued committing fraud-
related crimes; eventually pleading guilty to three: possession of a forged 
check (case no. 121904738), attempted mortgage fraud (case no. 121905343), 
and forgery (case no. 121905762). Id. Again he went back to prison. Id. 3 
Mulliner' s second sentence (second judge) 
Almost twelve years after sentencing, and after his failed attempts at 
probation and parole, Mulliner moved to correct his original sentence. R40-
53. For the first time he claimed that his original sentence was illegal because 
it failed to state whether Counts 1 and 2 were concurrent or consecutive to 
each other as required by Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(1)(a). Id. 
A different judge (second judge) found Mulliner' s original sentence to 
be "very unusual" and ultimately illegal. R79, 122. But the second judge also 
found that the first judge was "very clear" that he wanted Count 2 to run 
consecutive to the St. George Sentence to ensure that Mulliner had "separate 
accountability." R175. The second judge believed that the "normal" way to 
accomplish separate accountability would be for Counts 1 and 2 to be served 
3 These crimes, as well as Mulliner' s probation and parole history, are 
referenced in the opposition to Mulliner's motion to correct his sentence. 
R54-59. Additional information for each of these crimes can also be found in 
the dockets for each of the individual cases. The Court may take judicial 
notice of these other cases. See Utah R. Evid. 201 (Lexis 2017). 
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concurrent with each other and both consecutive to the St. George Sentence. 
R123. The second judge remarked, "That's what I think most [judges] would 
normally do." Id. But, the second judge continued, the first judge wanted to 
do" something out of the ordinary." Id. 
However, instead of correcting the original sentence to reflect what she 
believed was a "normal sentence," the second judge tried to correct it to 
"carr[y] out [the first judge's out-of-the-ordinary] intent." R124. Accordingly, 
the second judge corrected the sentence to run Counts 1 and 2 concurrent 
with each other but ran Count 1 concurrent to the St. George Sentence and 
Count 2 consecutive to the St. George Sentence. R74-76. Id.4 R121. Below is a 
visual illush·ation of Mulliner' s second sentence: 
Illustration #2 (Mulliner's second sentence) 
July 2, 2003 
l 
Count 1 (0-5 years) 
Count 2 (0-5 years) 
i 
March 17, 2004 March 16, 2009 
July 1, 2018 
l 
July 1, 2023 
l 
Count 2 (0-5 years) 
4 Mulliner appealed the second judge's order but the appeal was not 
timely. R87, 92- 94, 98-100. 
-6-
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B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
Mulliner' s third sentence 
More than a year later, Mulliner claimed that his second sentence (like 
his original sentence) was also illegal and moved to correct it. R138-150. 
Specifically, he argued that Count 2 could not run both concurrently with 
Count 1 and consecutive to his St. George Sentence because he would serve 
Count 2 twice. Id. He again asked a third judge (second judge had retired), to 
correct his second sentence to run Counts 1 and 2 consecutive to one another 
and both these Counts concurrent with his St. George Sentence. Id. 
The third judge agreed, at least in part. R220-33. The third judge agreed 
that Counts 1 and 2 could not run concurrent to each other if Count 1 ran 
concurrent to the St. George Sentence and Count 2 ran consecutive to the St. 
George Sentence. Id. This, he noted, was an II internal contradiction and a legal 
impossibility." R228; see Illustration #2 supra. 
But instead of adopting Mulliner' s proposed correction, the third judge 
tried to II restore" Mulliner' s original sentence from the first judge. R224-25. 
The II only correction" Mulliner' s original sentence needed, according to the 
third judge, was a statement of whether Counts 1 and 2 would run concurrent 
or consecutive to each other. R227-28. The third judge therefore ordered them 
to run consecutively. Id. But the third judge retained the portion of Mulliner' s 
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original sentence that required Count 1 to run concurrent with the St. George 
Sentence and Count 2 to run consecutive to the St. George Sentence. Id. Below 
is a visual illustration of Mulliner' s third sentence: 
Illustration #3 (Mulliner's third sentence) 
July 2, 2003 July 1, 2018 July 1, 2023 
l 1 
<;:ount 2 (0-5 years) 
March 16, 2009 March 16, 2014 
In doing so, the third judge noted that it was "clearly" the first judge's 
intention" to require one of the counts to run consecutively to [the St. George 
Sentence]." R225. The third judge thus refused to accept Mulliner' s proposed 
correction because it would "reduce his maximum sentence" from what the 
first judge intended by five years. R225. 
Mulliner timely filed this appeal. R232. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mulliner argues that his third sentence is illegal because it requires him 
to serve Count 2 twice. The State agrees. 
But the State does not agree that this Court should correct the sentence. 
Rather, this case should be remanded for resentencing. 
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At resentencing, the trial court should not be bound by the three prior 
sentences in this case. They are all illegal and, as such, are void. They have no 
legal effect and do not create any rights. Rather, the trial court should 
evaluate "the gravity and circumstances" of Mulliner' s crimes and his 
"history, character, and rehabilitative needs" to determine whether Counts 1 
and 2 should be served concurrent or consecutive to each other and whether 
they should be served concurrent or consecutive to the St. George Sentence. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
And if any of the prior sentences are relevant at resentencing, they all 
counsel against Mulliner's proposed correction. Mulliner argues that this 
Court should correct his sentence to run Counts 1 and 2 consecutives to each 
other, but concurrent with his St. George Sentence because this is most 
consistent with the intent of the Mulliner' s original sentence. 
Mulliner is wrong. The first judge stated that he wanted Count 2 to run 
consecutive to the St. George Sentence to ensure that Mulliner have" separate 
accountability" for his new crimes. The second judge, observed that the 
"normal sentence" in this situation (what "most [judges] would do" to 
provide separate accountability) was to II run [Counts 1 and 2] concurrent 
with each other ... and then run the case consecutive to the [St. George 
Sentence]." And even the third judge, asked, "Why not run [Counts 1 and 2] 
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concurrent with each other but consecutive to the [St. George Sentence]?" In 
sum, the two judges who reviewed Mulliner's challenges to his sentence 
rejected his proposal and recognized that the way to accomplish first judge's 
"separate accountability" concern was to have Counts 1 and 2 run concurrent 
to each other and consecutive to the St. George Sentence. This is the sentence 
Mulliner should receive. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mulliner's sentence is illegal and this case should be 
remanded for resentencing. 
Mulliner is correct about one thing: his sentence is ambiguous or, at 
best, internally contradictory. Count 2 cannot run consecutive to both Count 
1 and his St. George Sentence. This would require Count 2 to run twice: once 
consecutive to Count 1 (from March 2009 to March 2014) and again, a second 
time, consecutive to his St. George Sentence (from July 2018 to July 2023). See 
Illustration 3, supra. In fact, the three sentences imposed to date suffer from 
this same or similar defect. The sentence needs to be corrected. 
But contrary to Mulliner' s proposal that this Court correct his sentence, 
this case needs to be remanded. Because Mulliner's sentence is illegal, it is 
void. State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14,117,203 P.3d 984,988 (citing State v. Babbel, 
813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1981)); State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, 1 10, 99 P.3d 858, 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
861. In fact, all three of Mulliner's sentences have been illegal and void. They 
have "no legal effect." Black's Law Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004); see also 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 272 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (defining "void" to be something that has no "legal existence or 
effect"). Thus, they do not-and cannot-create, impair, or affect any rights. 
Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. The trial court must, therefore, resentence Mulliner. 
Also, because these sentences are void, at resentencing, the trial court 
should not be bound by any of them, including the original sentence. Rather, 
the trial court must exercise its discretion to determine whether Counts 1 
and 2 should run concurrent or consecutive to each other and whether they 
should run concurrent or consecutive to the St. George Sentence by 
considering "the gravity and circumstances of [Mulliner' s] offenses, the 
number of victims, and [his] history, character, and rehabilitative needs .... " 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(2); see also State v. Anderson, 2009 UT 13,126,203 
P.3d 990 (noting a decision of consecutive or concurrent sentences requires a 
trial court to "take into account ... 'the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant"' (internal citation omitted)). 
And even if the prior sentences have some effect on resentencing, they 
do not support Mulliner's proposal. Mulliner argues that the only way to 
legally fix his sentence is to order Counts 1 and 2 to run consecutive to each 
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other and concurrent with his St. George Sentence. Aplt.Brf.17; see also R259 
("I don't think any other construction of [the original] sentence ... can 
account for the language and not make an illegal sentence."). Below is an 
illustration of his proposal: 
Illustration #4 (Mulliner' s Proposal) 
July 2, 2003 
1 
March 17, 2004 March 16, 2009 March 16, 2014 
Mulliner argues that his proposal "accounts for all" the first judge's terms 
Aplt.Brf.18. 
It does not. The first judge ordered Count 2 to run consecutive to 
Mulliner' s St. George Sentence "so that there is some 1nodicum of separate 
accountability." R45-46, 224-25, 257-58. If Mulliner's original sentence is the 
model to be followed, as Mulliner argues, clearly this provision must be 
accounted for. But Mulliner ignores it. 
Yet there is a way to account for the first judge's order that Count 2 run 
consecutive to the St. George Sentence: order Counts 1 and 2 to run 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
concurrent to each other and consecutive to the St. George Sentence as 
illustrated below : 
Illustration #5 (State's Proposal) 
July 1, 2018 July 1, 2023 
l 
Count 1 (0-5 years) 
Count 2 (0-5 years) 
This is the proper way to correct Mulliner' s sentence and ensure that it 
complies with the first judge's intent that Mulliner have "separate 
accountability" for his crimes. 
Not only does this proposal comport with Mulliner's original sentence, 
it is likely what the first judge was attempting to do. The second judge 
acknowledged as much when it said tha t the "normal sentence w ould be 
[Counts 1 and 2] concurrent with each other ... and then run the case 
consecutively to the [St. George Sentence] .... That's what I think most 
[judges] would nonnally do." R123. And the third judge sirn.ilarly queried if 
it could give effect to first judge's order by si1nply "run[ning] [Counts 1 and 
2] concurrent with each other but consecutive with the [St. George 
Sentence]?" R257-58. Even Mulliner acknowled ged (in his prose motion) that 
if the first judge wanted to add Count 2 to the end of his St. George Sentence, 
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"All he had to do is order Counts 1 and 2 concurrent to each other and that 
sentence consecutive to the [St. George Sentence.]" R64. 
Importantly, the State's proposal is neither vindictive nor chilling. See, 
e.g., Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, 114 (noting a new sentence following a successful 
appeal cannot be vindictive nor have a chilling effect on defendants' rights to 
appeal). First, it changes nothing. The Board of Pardons and Parole has 
already interpreted Mulliner's previous sentences to run Count 2 consecutive 
to his St. George Sentence, thus (identical to the State's proposal) adding five 
years to his maximum sentence. R108, 229, 254. Second, it complies with Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401 in all respects. And, third, although Mulliner may be 
entitled to a corrected sentence, he is not entitled to a reduced one. 
In the end, Mulliner is serving a longer sentence, not because of the 
three flawed sentencing orders in this case, but because of his own failures. 
Mulliner has had multiple chances at probation and parole but continued to 
commit the same or similar crimes that landed him in prison. He has earned 
his sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mulliner's sentence is illegal and therefore void. This Court should 
remand this case for resentencing. On remand, in determining whether the 
sentences are concurrent or consecutive to each other and concurrent or 
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consecutive to the St. George Sentence, the trial court should consider "the 
gravity and circumstances of [Mulliner' s] offenses, the number of victims, 
and [his] history, character, and rehabilitative needs .... " as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). 
Respectfully submitted on January 25, 2017. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
/s/ Nathan Anderson 
NATHAN ANDERSON 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Utah Code Annotated§ 76-3-401 {West 2017) 
(1) A court shall determin~, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for 
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with 
any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the 
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless 
the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall 
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided 
under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
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(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed 
for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison 
terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently 
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides 
the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TODD MULLINER, 
Defendant. 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 031404403 FS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Motion Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 3, 2016 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: Sherry E. Ragan 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
100 East Center Street 
For the Defendant: 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
Todd Mulliner 
(Appearing prose) 
942 South Aspen Way 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
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1 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on February 3, 2016) 
3 COURT CLERK: They're ready for their oral argument. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, let's take care of the matter. I 
5 believe the prison is here with the defendant. Let's have 
6 Mr. Mulliner brought in, if you would. Thank you. All right. 
7 MR. MULLINER: Oh, here, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: We'll call the matter of State vs. Mulliner. 
9 Mr. Mulliner is here from the Utah State Prison, and Ms. Ragan 
10 is here on behalf of the State in this matter. We're here on 
11 Mr. Mulliner's motion to correct an illegal sentence under 
12 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
13 I have read everything. I have looked at the case 
14 law. I've also looked at incidentally what happened down in 
15 Washington County with you're motion down there. My ultimate 
16 conclusion from that case, Mr. Mulliner, is that you were 
17 
18 
19 
20 
really lucky because you had -- you entered pleas to three 
115's and they only sentenced you on one of them. So count 
your blessings and run on that one. 
So let me hear your arguments, and I would just put 
21 on the record we're in a rather interesting situation in this 
22 case. This is a very old case. The number of the case is 
23 031404403. So the sentencing on this case took place on 
24 March 17 th of 2004 before Judge Anthony Schofield, and we have 
25 our written file which I've printed out. 
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The defendant about a year ago, I believe it was, a 
year and a half ago, requested a copy of the tape. That was in 
the days when we were on video tape, not digital audio as we 
are now. A copy was made and was sent to him by my law clerk 
bailiff. In the meantime, under our retention schedule of such 
materials, those tapes have been destroyed. So we no long have 
the original. 
Mr. Mulliner's brother, apparently, was the one who 
ended up with the tape, made his own transcript. So there's no 
way for me to get an official transcript of this. So officially 
what I can rely on are the written materials in the file. The 
transcript is interesting, but not being an official transcript 
I'm in a little bit of an awkward place as to use that for any-
thing. 
I think the parties agree that the statute that I am 
looking at is 76-3-401, which was amended in 2002, and as far 
as I can see has not been amended since then. The interesting 
thing about that amendment is that the previous presumption 
of concurrent sentencings if the State I'm sorry, if the 
Court didn't say anything else, is gone. So I don't have any 
presumptions to fall back upon as I did before the amendment 
in 2002. 
As I look at it and look at that statute, it says, 
"The Court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment, a) if the sentences imposed 
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are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and b} 
if the sentences before the Court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already 
serving. 
So, Mr. Mulliner, I am interested to hear your oral 
arguments today on which parts of 76-3-401 you think Judge 
Schofield complied with and which parts you don't think he 
complied with. Do you need to have a hand release so you can 
look at your materials? 
10 MR. MULLINER: Yes, I was going to ask that. I need to 
11 be able to access this folder, if that's all right. (i} 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Which hand would be helpful? 
MR. MULLINER: The right would be the best. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MULLINER: No chance that I can just have both free 
to --
THE COURT: No, I don't think under the prison's guide-
lines I'm going to allow that, but I will let you have one hand 
ready to go. 
MR. MULLINER: Okay, thank you, your Honor. Just get 
a few things so I can -- I should be able to answer that. I 
tried to organize it because I knew that might be the case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MULLINER: Okay, so are you ready for me, then? 
THE COURT: I am. I am. 
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MR. MULLINER: First of all, let me -- can I add one 
other thing that I kind of implied in the motion but later 
discovered was apparently there's a Rule 30(b) as well, which 
what it addresses is essentially that the Court can correct 
clerical errors, errors that are outside of judicial reasoning, 
you know, wasn't an error -- you can't address judicial reason-
ing errors, but --
THE COURT: 30(b) in the Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
MR. MULLINER: Yes. So because my the first point 
is is that the con -- the commitment order as it currently 
reads, the actual sentence prison concurrent/consecutive note 
is simply not accurate. It's not accurate to what Judge 
Schofield said that day. You know, he said, "I am going to 
order that Count I of the matter run concurrent to the other 
time you're serving,n and it says, "The sentence for Count I is 
to run consecutive to the time the defendant is now serving.n 
So it was just -- I'm sure it's a clerical error, but 
it's simply wrong. So even if the Court today decides that 
somehow this doesn't rise to the level of an illegal sentence, 
the -- both the jurisdiction and discretion exists for the 
Court to be able to clear up clerical issues, to fix a poorly 
written order. So that's kind of -- so I don't -- you know, 
23 being a lay person, I'm not sure I understand exactly how to 
24 present that, but I would present that as --
25 THE COURT: Well, it requires me to rely on your 
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brother's transcript, doesn't it? 
MR. MULLINER: Yeah, which -- can I address that for 
just a moment? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. MULLINER: Would that be all right? He -- I mean, 
so he gets -- receives this I think it was October of 2014. 
So it's about 15, 16 months ago now, and transcribes it, and 
you're right, because it was on VHS he didn't even have a VCR 
in his home. I think we have -- does the Court have this 
THE COURT: He filed an affidavit, uh-huh. 
MR. MULLINER: Okay, and I mean, there's certainly 
no reason why he would -- he doesn't have an expectation that 
the Court doesn't have a copy of it. He's not going to tran-
scribe the thing incorrectly. I've since asked him, I've said, 
"Brenton, absolutely swear to me you didn't -- you know, you 
weren't tempted at moments, oh, that doesn't sound quite as 
17 good in Todd's favor, so I'll adapt it just a hair." 
18 He, of course, has told me no. "Look, Todd, like it 
19 says in that affidavit, when it was done, I watched the thing, 
20 read it along. It's exactly as I saw it on that tape." 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MULLINER: By the way, I was there. So I -- when 
23 the Board gave me five additional years, that's when I became 
24 
25 
aware ~f this and was so surprised -- when I got my date back 
from the Board I said, "Whoa, they just sentenced me beyond my 
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actual sentence expiration.n 
THE COURT: Okay, I understand all that. 
MR. MULLINER: So, okay. 
THE COURT: I want you to go to the statute. 
MR. MULLINER: Okay, so --
THE COURT: Anything else is a waste of time, okay? 
MR. MULLINER: All right, the statute -- in my opinion 
there's two issues. There's a legal matter that has to do with 
the statute and then there's his actual intent at the time, but 
let's just address the statute. The -- it is my contention 
that it simply does not allow for the sentence to run the way 
it is. 
You cannot have -- the Counts I and II are the only 
counts that were before the Court and under its jurisdiction 
at that time. Any other offenses or the time I was previously 
serving out of Washington County that I was already serving at 
the time, is not at that moment under the jurisdiction of that 
Court. 
So when the statute clearly reads that it must -- the 
counts must run either concurrent or consecutive to each other 
-- so Counts I and II must be either concurrent or consecutive, 
according to this -- my brother's transcript, there's certainly 
no -- no dispute that he said Count I of the matter is to run 
concurrent to the other time I'm serving. 
So the issue is how do Counts I and II -- they have to 
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be either concurrent or consecutive to each other. Clearly he 
didn't order Count II concurrent with Count I. He ordered it 
consecutive to Count I. So I think it's literally that simple. 
THE COURT: Well, then how do I deal with part (b) of 
the statute? 
MR. MULLINER: Then part (b) is then how-- so once 
you've disposed of the offenses that are before the Court, are 
they concurrent or consecutive to one another, then how does 
that sentence deal with if there is. Then it says in (b), and 
-- and "and" is significant there -- if there is time that the 
defend-ant is serving, you know, other sentences, then how does 
the sentence relate to that time. 
So he could have run -- for example, he could have 
run Counts I and II consecutive to one another, and that whole 
sentence consecutive to the one to fifteen. That's certainly 
not what he intended at the time. 
THE COURT: How do I know that? Even if -- even if I 
take your transcript, your brother's transcript as the truth 
here 
MR. MULLINER: Okay. 
THE COURT: He says Count I runs -- Judge Schofield 
says Count I runs concurrent to other time you are serving. 
that would be under part (b) 
So 
MR. MULLINER: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- and then Count II runs consecutive so 
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that you will have one concurrent and one consecutive sentence 
so that there is some modicum of separate accountability. Count 
I obviously comes under part (b}, because he talks about --
MR. MULLINER: Correct. 
THE COURT: -- with any other sentences that you're 
serving. 
MR. MULLINER: Of course. 
THE COURT: Any other time that you're serving; but how 
do I assume, as you want me to, that Count II comes under part 
(a}? 
MR. MULLINER: Two reasons. Because to do it otherwise 
then they don't -- if Count I is running concurrent with the 
time I was already serving --
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. MULLINER: -- and Count II is then run consecutive 
to the time I was already serving, Count I and II are neither 
concurrent not consecutive to each other. So part (a) is not 
satisfied, and we have to satisfy both (a) and (b). It's not 
an "or," so that's the reason. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. MULLINER: When it's run that way, Count I is 
-- would have started immediately, 2004 for five years, and 
Count II doesn't start until the end of the time I was already 
serving 2018, and run for five years. So those two counts as 
they relate to one another, they are neither concurrent not 
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consecutive. So the law simply doesn't allow, even if that's 
what he intended -- my contention to the Court is that the law 
does not allow for that sentence construction. That sentence 
construction is in fact an illegal sentence. 
THE COURT: All right, anything else? 
MR. MULLINER: Then I would just address real quickly 
the -- so that there's a modicum of separate accountability 
-- and by the way, I recall him saying that. That's one of 
the things -- that very phrase, oddly enough, all these years 
later, I told my brother before he got the transcript that he 
talked about a "modicum of accountability." 
I did not remember the word "separate," but if Count 
II is to run consecutive to the time I was already serving, 
that exposes me to the maximum five year sentence, and that 
would be a maximum of separate accountability, not a modicum 
of separate accountability. 
If it's to run consecutive to Count I, as I'm suggest-
ing, then what happens is the Board calculates a 40 percent add 
on to the suggested or recommended matrix. 
THE COURT: Sir, I'm not concerned one bit with how the 
Board of Pardons does anything. 
MR. MULLINER: Well, my only point to that 
THE COURT: That's not my issue today. 
MR. MULLINER: -- but my point is that 
THE COURT: I know it's your issue. 
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MR. MULLINER: Well, His Honor, at the time --
THE COURT: Not mine. 
MR. MULLINER: it was his issue, because what he was 
saying was a modicum. So his intent is what I'm driving at. 
So I believe both his intent and the law only allows for the 
one sentence construction, which is Count I concurrent, because 
that was obvious; and Count II, consecutive to Count I. That 
is literally the only sentence construction that makes sense. 
At the time is what I understood, and it's what I believe is 
the only legal sentence in this case. 
THE COURT: All right, anything else? 
MR. MULLINER: That's pretty much it. 
THE COURT: All right, let's have you have a seat over 
in the jury box while Ms. Ragan comes up to the podium. 
MR. MULLINER: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right, go ahead, Ms. Ragan. 
MS. RAGAN: Judge, you know, I think one thing that's 
clear to all of us is it unfortunate that the defendant's 
19 chosen some of the choices that he has. He is obviously 
20 extremely intelligent and has thought about this a lot. 
21 
22 
23 
I don't know that I disagree with him completely 
in his calculation, but the first issue is that he's already 
served the time on Count I. So I don't know how we can change 
24 anything with that. The five years was to run concurrent. 
25 THE COURT: Well, as I look at it, Ms. Ragan, I --
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MS. RAGAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- that's not my concern. 
MS. RAGAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm dealing with correcting the sentence, 
and I am not going to be worried about how the Board has 
calculated anything. I can't figure that out. It's not my 
problem. It's not my issue. Whether or not they determine 
he's already served the time is up to them. 
MS. RAGAN: Well, I'm just saying we don't have juris-
diction over that, because if it were to run concurrent, he's 
11 done more than five years. 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
13 MS. RAGAN: So that obviously has already been served. 
14 So the only thing left is for him to serve the consecutive 
15 count to the one to fifteen, which is what he's doing. This 
16 is not an illegal sentence, because if it were, then the Board 
17 had the opportunity to send this back and to ask the Court to 
18 correct it. They haven't even found that there's any ambiguity 
19 in it, because they've interpreted it, and appropriately they 
20 calculate it, come up with the determination that they have 
21 had. So I don't -- I don't see that it falls under either 
22 one of those at this point as being an illegal sentence. 
23 THE COURT: So how do -- how do I make what Judge 
24 Schofield did fit the statute? Because clearly he has to do 
25 two things --
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MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: --if there's another case that he's already 
serving time on. So under A 
MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: -- he has to determine whether these two 
counts together run concurrently or consecutively --
MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: -- and then two, if there is another 
sentence, he has to deal with that. It's not clear what he 
thought he -- which of these he did. 
MS. RAGAN: No, I agree, but I don't think the Court 
has jurisdiction over that anymore. They -- because the one's 
already served, then the only thing that's left to do is the 
second count, which is the cons~cutive Count. Anything you do 
at this point either -- is going to interfere with that because 
it's already -- that's already peen served. So the Court can't 
change that. 
THE COURT: But -- but I think in that analysis you're 
19 working from the transcript, because what the document says --
20 MS. RAGAN: Right. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: -- is the sentence for Count I is to run 
concurrent --
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
THE COURT: -- or I'm sorry, it's consecutive. The 
sentence for Count I is to run consecutive to the time the 
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defendant is now serving. 
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
THE COURT: So by your calculations, no, that wouldn't 
have begun yet if I leave it as Judge Schofield had it. 
MS. RAGAN: Yeah. Well, either Count the way it runs. 
But the only way that -- the only -- I don't know what the 
Court can do, because either you order now that they both run 
concurrent to each other, which doesn't make sense --
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. RAGAN: -- or you run them both to be consecutive 
to each other, which also doesn't make sense. So I don't know 
what else we do except leave it as it is because obviously 
the Board is not concerned that there's any ambiguity or any 
14 illegality here. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, if I were to make it -- my 
16 concern is, regardless of what the Board does --
17 MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: -- or has done --
MS. RAGAN: Yeah. 
18 
19 
20 THE COURT: it's not their call legally to determine 
21 whether or not this is an illegal sentence. It comes back to 
22 the Court to take care of that, and I let whatever happens at 
23 the Board happen with them. 
24 
25 
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
THE COURT: But my concern is that I comply with 76-3-
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401. As I look at it, it seems to me if I were -- if I were to 
take the transcript at face value for what the brother did with 
it --
MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: it seems to me Judge Schofield complied 
with part (b). He was concerned about 
MS. RAGAN: Oh, absolutely. 
THE COURT: -- the cases that were --
MS. RAGAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- that he was already serving time on --
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
THE COURT: -- and that's what he was concentrating on. 
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
14 THE COURT: Frankly, to me, the logical thing to do is 
15 to run the two counts -- to give the defendant the benefit of 
16 the doubt, run the two counts under A concurrently with each 
17 other, and then leave Bas I think Judge Schofield did, which 
18 was one concurrent and one consecutive. I think that's what he 
19 intended. I don't know what that does with the Board --
MS. RAGAN: Yeah, I --
THE COURT: -- but that's their call. 
MS. RAGAN: Yeah. Well, yeah. 
20 
21 
22 
23 THE COURT: And if they find that he's served all the 
24 time --
25 MS. RAGAN: Yeah. 
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1 THE COURT: -- fine. If they find there's something 
2 consecutive yet to be served, fine. That is their issue, not 
3 mine. 
4 MS. RAGAN: Right, yeah, and I don't disagree with 
5 that. It doesn't make sense to me how those can be served 
6 concurrently now, but I don't -- I don't see any other way to 
7 do it either. 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, I -- I think the defendant 
9 has a point. 
10 MS. RAGAN: Yeah, I do, too. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
statute. 
THE COURT: Judge Schofield did not comply with the 
MS. RAGAN: Absolutely, yeah. 
THE COURT: If the defendant had not already been 
15 serving time on another case 
16 MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
17 THE COURT: -- then what Judge Schofield did would make 
18 absolutely no sense. He clearly knew there was another case --
19 
20 
21 
22 
MS. RAGAN: Right. 
THE COURT: -- and was attempting to deal with that. 
MS. RAGAN: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: As I read it, I think he skipped over A and 
23 went straight to B --
24 
25 
MS. RAGAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --and didn't solve that problem. So what's 
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your opinion as to correcting the record as far as the compar-
ison between the brother's transcript and what the clerk did? 
MS. RAGAN: I don't have a problem with that. 
THE COURT: Making it -- making it read 
MS. RAGAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- the sentence for Count I is to run con-
current? 
MS. RAGAN: You know, when we don't have a record you 
reconstruct it the best way you can, and I don't 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. RAGAN: -- I don't have a problem with that. 
THE COURT: Okay, so you wouldn't have a problem with 
my switching the words to be consistent with the brother's? 
MS. RAGAN: No. 
THE COURT: Make Count I concurrent and Count II 
consecutive? 
MS. RAGAN: Yeah, I don't see that the defendant has any 
reason to be misrepresenting that. It gives him no advantage. 
So, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything else? 
MS. RAGAN: No, that's all. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Mulliner, you get the last word. 
23 It's your motion. 
24 MR. MULLINER: It's what I've always wanted, the last 
2 5 word with two women. 
-17-
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THE COURT: Well, I'm just saying that to be nice. 
MR. MULLINER: Yeah, that's --
THE COURT: Ultimately I will have the last word. 
MR. MULLINER: -- yes, I think -- I think I'm -- I've 
addressing (inaudible) enough to know that for sure. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MULLINER: I would only make two comments about 
what Ms. Ragan just addressed, and I'm just emphasizing what 
you already said. She's -- she keeps trying to say that the 
Board didn't see it as an illegal sentence. That's completely 
irrelevant. It is not the standard is not whether the Board 
recognizes it as illegal or inappropriate or incorrect. They 
only get a commitment order and follow whatever the commitment 
order says. So that certainly doesn't apply. 
Then I would -- if we're following, which I appreciate 
Ms. Ragan's willingness to address, there's certainly no reason 
that my brother misrepresented the transcript. So Count I of 
the matter is running concurrent to the other time, and Count 
II then runs consecutive to Count I. If that's the corrected 
20 commitment order that gets sent to the Board then the Board 
21 deals with it. 
22 Even he says in here, the Board of Pardons will figure 
23 out what to do with that, and then apparently was inaudible. 
24 
25 
So I would just emphasize and ask your Honor to please rewrite 
it, have it rewritten that way, and that's then both accurate 
-18-
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to what happened that day and a legal sentence, in my opinion. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. MULLINER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Hang on just a second. 
MR. MULLINER: Thanks to the Court for the time. 
THE COURT: You can just stand there and I'll make my 
I'm going to make my decision right now. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 MR. MULLINER: Okay. Are you? Okay, great. Thank you 
9 very much. 
THE COURT: I'm just trying to get it --
MR. MULLINER: I want to express appreciation 
THE COURT: --some paper that I can make some notes on. 
MR. MULLINER: -- to Ms. Ragan as well for her time. 
THE COURT: Okay, the issue here is whether or not I 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
should grant the motion to correct any illegal sentence, and if 
I do, what it should be. So I first find that the sentencing 
17 document from March 17 th of 2004 reflecting the sentence of 
18 Judge Schofield creates some problems, and I do grant the 
19 motion to correct the illegal sentence, because as I indicated 
20 earlier, it's very clear to me as I look at Section 76-3-401 
21 that Judge Schofield was concentrating on the issue of separate 
22 accountability with regard to the previous crime. 
23 He had a defendant in front of him who was already in 
24 prison serving a one to fifteen out of St. George in Washington 
25 County in the Fifth District; and I'm -- with the State's 
-19-
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acquiescence I'm going to take the defendant's brother's tran-
script of the video tape at face value. I think there 
under Rule 30(b} I think there was a clerical error if I do 
that, because the clerk switched around the concurrent and 
the consecutive words and put them in the wrong order. It's 
interestingly also reflected upon the form that she filled out 
as she was doing it. 
The bigger question is how do I resolve the issue 
here. We have several cases, including State v. Yazzie or 
Yazzie however you say it, Y-a-z-z-I-e -- that say two 
critical things. No. 1, a sentence must be final at the 
time of the original sentencing. We can't wait until later 
to determine whether something is consecutive or concurrent; 
but No. 2, if the original sentencing order is illegal and 
is unclear, the reviewing Judge, which would be me, has the 
capability to re-sentence to make it a legal sentence. 
There's a No. 3 for me. I need to carry out as near 
as I can determine what the determination and the reasoning was 
of Judge Schofield. Having been in this business for 30 years 
now, approaching 31, what he did was very unusual, not only 
for him, but for all of us. It's very clear as I read the 
transcript and I look at the crimes that were before Judge 
Schofield, that it was his intention to deal with concurrent 
and consecutive with reference to the St. George case and the 
time that the defendant was already serving. 
-20-
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As I look at subsections (a) and (b) of 76-3-401(1), I 
believe from reading the transcript that the Judge skipped over 
A in his concern and his, as he said, his intent to punish the 
defendant with some accountability. He said, as quoted, "A 
modicum of separate accountability," that he somehow forgot 
to take care of subsection {a), which was whether or not the 
sentences would run concurrently with each other, and he 
skipped right to subsection {b). 
As I've indicated in talking to both the defendant and 
the prosecutor, my concern here is not how the Board treats 
this. That's their game. I don't worry about that when I 
sentence defendants. I figure the chips fall where they fall, 
and I make what I believe is the appropriate order. 
I think the transcript shows that Judge Schofield 
intended to do something out of the ordinary when he says at 
the end, "The Board of Pardons will figure out what to do with 
that." He knew he was doing something differently, because I 
think the normal sentence would be concurrent with each other, 
the two counts concurrent with each other, and then run the 
case consecutively to the case that already had time being 
served on. That's what I think most of us would normally do. 
I think his comments show that he knew he was doing 
something differently. I, myself, have never run one count 
consecutive to another case and one count concurrent to another 
case. I think that's confusing; but I don't think it's illegal. 
-21-
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I don't -- I've looked through the statutes. I don't think 
there's anything here that would keep him from doing something 
like that. That's what I think he's talking about when he says 
"some modicum of separate accountability." 
So I think the appropriate thing for me to do is, 
No. 1, fix the clerical error; and I think that's -- you're 
right, I can do that under Rule 30(b), and put the concurrent 
first and the consecutively second; but I think the appropriate 
thing otherwise for me to do is to take care of subsection (a) 
and then do subsection (b}, which is I think what the Judge 
wanted to do. The problem here is that Judge Schofield retired 
quite some time ago. He's not here to fix this --
MR. MULLINER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- and it wasn't done in a manner and in a 
time when anybody could have had any memory of this. So I am 
going to, with the help of your brother's transcript, try to 
resolve this in a manner which I think carries out Judge 
Schofield's intent and correct the illegal sentence. 
So I have two counts here. One is a sale of unregi-
stered security, a third-degree felony. I will order that --
and I'm giving you the benefit under part (a), because Judge 
Schofield didn't address it, I think the only fair thing at 
this point is to do is to assume that he meant concurrent. I 
think to do otherwise is not fair to you. So I'm going to make 
it concurrent. So I will order that those two zero to fives 
-22-
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will run concurrent with each other. That takes care of part 
(a). 
Under part (b) I will do what I think was his intent. 
That Count I, which is the sale of unregistered security, will 
run concurrently with the St. George case, and hang on, I want 
to put that exact number -- have to find it. 
MR. MULLINER: They're all old numbers, aren't they? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. RAGAN: Judge, I have it, I think. 
THE COURT: I've got it, too, here. 
MS. RAGAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay, it will run concurrently with case 
No. 991500379. That's Count I. Count II will run consecutively 
to case No. 991500379. What I'm going to do, I'm going to make 
this an amended sentencing. So I'm going to reiterate the other 
terms, and order again the same restitution that was ordered 
before of $2,975 and no cents. It says, "Victim care of the 
State of Utah." These days we would have more information in 
there than that. 
MR. MULLINER: Sure. 
THE COURT: So that would be up to AP&P. They would 
have that information. I will also order that the defendant is 
23 not to have any employment where he has fiduciary responsibi-
24 lity. I think that covers -- he didn't give you any credit for 
25 -- or recommend any credit for time served. 
-23-
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MR. MULLINER: There was none at that point or anything 
so --
THE COURT: Okay. All right, you were just being held 
on the other case? 
MR. MULLINER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay, so there's no order or recommendation 
to be made there. I can't actually order it. I just have to 
remand -- or recommend it. 
MR. MULLINER: Sure. 
THE COURT: I think that covers everything that he 
covered. I would remand you back to the custody of the trans-
portation officers. We will prepare very carefully an amended 
sentencing, judgment and commitment that in it -- Joy's been 
taking notes -- indicates that I granted the motion to correct 
15 the illegal sentence, and I re-sentenced the defendant in a 
16 manner which I thought was consistent with what Judge Schofield 
17 intended to do. All right, anything else from either side? 
18 (No verbal response) 
19 THE COURT: Then we will send that straight up to the 
20 Board of Pardons so that they will have it. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
MR. MULLINER: Excellent. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
MR. MULLINER: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate it. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(June 7, 2017) 
MR. POMEROY: Good morning, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: The court will call number 13, Todd 
Todd Mulliner. Oh, he's a ... Okay. 
Good morning, Mr. Mulliner. How are you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Good. Go ahead, Mr. Thompson. 
MR. THOMPSON: Well, I guess I need to know 
10 what are the court's intentions for today. We filed a 
11 motion, it was not responded to by the state. We filed an 
12 order, or a request to submit and the court scheduled this 
13 hearing as a hearing on the motion. But I, are you expecting 
14 oral argument today or--
15 THE JUDGE: Yes. Some sort of help on that. 
16 And I did notice the state hadn't responded. 
17 intending not to oppose this? 
Is the state 
18 MR. POMEROY: If we're having oral arguments, 
19 the state will respond. 
20 MR. THOMPSON: I would object to the state 
21 responding simply because they have not responded at this 
22 point, haven't provided me any opportunity to take note of 
23 what their position would be. So I would ask the court not 
24 allow the state to present anything today because they, 
25 they didn't file anything when they had that opportunity. 
3 
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1 THE JUDGE: Well, unfortunately the court has to 
2 do the right thing today and so I want just want as much 
3 help as I can get. 
4 me--
So just any help that you can give 
5 
6 
MR. THOMPSON: Very well. 
THE JUDGE: and then I'll take any help from 
7 the state as well. 
8 ARGUMENT BY MR. THOMPSON 
9 MR. THOMPSON: The, the background, Your Honor, 
10 is that a, that a sentencing took place in 2004. Judge a, 
11 Schofield gave what was a sort of confusing sentencing order 
12 which was exacerbated by a, what looked like a clerical 
13 error by the clerks in the, in the written sentencing 
14 order. 
15 THE JUDGE: Remind me. So he was already serving 
16 a 1-to-15? 
17 MR. THOMPSON: He was serving 1-to-15 and that, 
18 we'll characterize that as the St. George case. 
19 THE JUDGE: And then he was sentenced here on, was 
20 it two, thirds. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. THOMPSON: Two, third degree felonies, 
O-to-5, Count 1 and Count 2 is how I phrase them in the, 
in the motion. 
THE JUDGE: And Count 1 Judge Schofield said was 
going to go consecutive. 
4 
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1 MR. THOMPSON: So I'll just read it to the 
2 court if you want. This is the, the transcript that has 
3 been accepted by Judge Laycock. Okay. So after the 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
arguments Judge Schofield says: 
because 
court. 
In the matter number 20 on the 
calendar on each third degree felony it 
will be the order of the court that the 
defendant serve an indeterminate term of 
not more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison, and order additionally that 
you pay restitution in the sum of 
2,975. 
That you not hold any positions of 
fiduciary responsibility. 
I'm going to order that Count 1 of the 
matter run concurrent to the other time 
you are serving, and Count 2 run 
consecutive, so that you will have one 
concurrent and one consecutive sentence, 
so that there is some modicum of separate 
accountability. The board of pardons 
can figure out what to do with that. 
That last sentence is, is a little disconcerting 
well so that was, that was the question of the 
5 
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1 THE JUDGE: Yes. And the question I have also 
2 on that is since, now the board of pardons I've heard, and 
3 other judges have told me, in fact the board of pardons has 
4 told me they've done this, when they can't understand a 
5 sentence they do remand it back to a judge. There are some, 
6 some situations where a judge will, for example, because the 
7 parties request it, will sentence someone to a third degree 
8 felony that's really a second degree felony or a second 
9 degree--
10 MR. THOMPSON: Uh-huh {affirmative). 
11 THE JUDGE: felony that's really a third, and 
12 they don't understand, they send it back for clarifying. 
13 I don't see any record that they have ever sent 
14 this case back. So do you know how the board of pardons has 
15 
16 
17 
interpreted that sentence? 
MR. THOMPSON: 
better example of that. 
Mr. Mulliner probably has a 
But before we answer that 
18 question I would suggest that whatever the board of pardons, 
19 whether they think it is illegal or not is not question 
20 that's presented in our motion. We believe the language 
21 of the, of the order is illegal. If the board of pardons is 
22 interpreting it in a way that, that they think is fine 
23 doesn't change the fact that this might be an illegal 
24 sentence and, and if they want to impose a harsher sentence 
25 on Mr. Mulliner than, than Judge Schofield intended or the 
6 
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1 law would allow, whether or not they're happy with it I 
2 don't think changes things. 
3 position. 
So that's our official 
4 If the court is still interested in that answer 
5 Mr. Mulliner can probably let you know what they are doing. 
6 
7 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: If you don't mind, Your Honor, I 
8 think the reason the board does not have a question is 
9 because the clerk of the court, the commitment order is 
10 very clear but this clerk took it upon himself or herself to 
11 interpret that. 
12 
13 
MR. THOMPSON: 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Oh, in the original order? 
In the original commitment order 
14 to the board. That's why they don't have a question. 
15 
16 
THE JUDGE: So what has the board done? 
THE DEFENDANT: They have run, they have run 
17 Count 1 concurrent with the 1-to-15 the St. George matter, 
18 and Count 2 consecutive to the St. George matter. 
19 THE JUDGE: So they have done essentially exactly 
20 what Judge Schofield ordered. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: They've done what the clerk wrote 
22 in the order. That's correct. 
23 
24 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. THOMPSON: 
Okay. 
So from the motion that we filed, 
25 Judge, we talked about, we began with an explanation of 
7 
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1 76-3-401, the statute that was in place at the time of the 
2 sentencing is also currently the law. That statute 
3 requires that when a, when a judge is confronted with 
4 multiple convictions there's, there's a method in, in order 
5 to determine how sentences can run concurrent or consecutive 
6 to each other. 
7 The first step the court needs to take is to deal 
8 with the, with the Counts within the immediate case upon 
9 which sentence is being imposed. And that's the operative 
10 language in, in subsection (1) (a). If the sentences 
11 imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively with each 
12 other. 
13 That was the part of the initial sentencing order 
14 that is illegal. Judge Schofield--
15 THE JUuGE: Tell me how, how you support the fact 
16 that it has to be sequential like it says there, I mean, like 
17 you're saying it has to be. It just says and. It doesn't 
18 say first and second. And in your briefing you have to do A 
19 first and then B, and you can't reverse them. 
20 MR. THOMPSON: Well perfectly, I mean, this is 
21 a perfect example of why it has to go this way because if the 
22 judge, like Judge Schofield does, starts to interpret 
23 individual pieces within one case not, not related to each 
24 other. 
25 For example, the problem with the initial 
8 
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1 sentencing order is that it doesn't talk about a 
2 relationship between Count 1 and Count 2, and he didn't even 
3 mention that. When courts make that relationship first 
4 then they can talk about how this case will relate to any 
5 other cases. But if the judge starts dealing with 
6 individual Counts and, and placing them consecutive or 
7 concurrent to other cases it doesn't establish a relationship 
8 within this case. 
9 And the consequence of that mistake are exactly 
10 what happened in this case. And the diagrams I think are 
11 the best place to see how that works. 
12 THE JUDGE: So you're saying that because he had 
13 the Counts apply separately to prior cases that he didn't 
14 rule on how they would apply to each other? 
15 MR. THOMPSON: And he didn't. There's nothing 
16 in the order that explains how Count 1 and Count 2 relate to 
17 each other. 
18 Judge Laycock recognized that when it was 
19 brought before her. He said, she said it doesn't, the 
20 board would have no idea about how to relate to Count 1 
21 and Count 2. 
22 Now, I think she took that too far, and as I 
23 explained in the motion, when she ruled that just by the 
24 benefit of the doubt she was going to give him concurrent 
25 within, within the case with Count 1 and Count 2 to run 
9 
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1 concurrent she exacerbated the problem. 
2 From what I read here the most logical sensible 
3 way to read what Judge Schofield initially said was to, to 
4 run Count 1 and Count 2 consecutively and then run the case 
5 concurrent with, with the other case. And the reason you 
6 get--
7 THE JUDGE: Why not opposite? Why not run them 
8 concurrent with each other but consecutive to the other 
9 case? 
10 MR. THOMPSON: Because he explicitly said 
11 Count 1 is concurrent with the other case, and that's the 
12 only language that's perfectly clear in the order. 
13 is concurrent with the St. George case. 
Count 1 
14 THE JUDGE: Why isn't it perfectly clear that 
15 Count 2 would go consecutive? How is that not perfectly 
16 clear? 
17 MR. THOMPSON: Because he doesn't say consecutive 
18 to what. In the order he says--. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Says consecutive. Well, 
20 continue. 
21 MR. THOMPSON: I'll take care of it. 
22 says and one consecutive. So I'll read it again. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. THOMPSON: 
23 
24 
25 Count 1 of the matter will run 
And he 
10 
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1 
2 
3 
concurrent to the other time you are 
serving. 
That's perfectly clear. Count 1 is concurrent 
4 with St. George. We know that that was his intent. 
5 
6 
7 
And then he says, 
and then Count 2 run consecutive. 
But he doesn't finish the sentence, he doesn't 
8 (short indecipherable) to what. 
9 Now, one inference is he's just talking about the 
10 St. George case but I understand that's a possible 
11 inference. 
12 THE JUDGE: That's grammatically the correct 
13 inference, yes. You admit that. 
14 MR. THOMPSON: I don't know. I don't, actually 
15 don't admit that. I mean, I read this is a possibility, a 
16 logical possibility that he's talking about Count 1. 
17 THE JUDGE: All right. I'll just tell you 
18 grammatically that's correct, that he's referring to the 
19 St. George case. 
20 
21 
22 
MR. THOMPSON: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. THOMPSON: 
Okay. 
Then let's go from there. 
Then he may have made a 
23 grammatical error. I think he made a few. 
24 But, but my point is there is another inference 
25 that can be drawn from this, that he may be talking about 
11 
0258 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0012 
1 2, running Count 2 consecutive to Count 1, it's a 
2 possibility. 
3 What is impossible is when Judge Laycock looks at 
4 this and says I'm going to have Count 1 and Count 2 run at 
5 the same time and Count 1 run concurrently with the 
6 St. George case. She can't also therefore remove Count 2 
7 from its, from its running concurrent with Count 1 and then 
8 put it consecutive to Count 2. That is an eternally 
9 illogical and a, and nonsensical sentence. 
10 And I think under the rule the sentence that is 
11 in place today based on Judge Laycock's amendment is 
12 illegal. 
13 So we, we think that she made that mistake by 
14 making Count 1 and Count 2 concurrent. We think Count 1 
15 and Count 2 should be consecutive to each other and 
16 concurrent with the other case. That would give effect to 
17 all of the language in Judge Schofield's initial order and 
18 make a, a sentence that is not illegal. 
19 I don't think any other construction of this 
20 sentence can do that, can make it, can account for the 
21 language and not make an illegal sentence. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE JUDGE: From the state? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. POMEROY 
MR. POMEROY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, I'm just going to assume for today's 
12 
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1 purposes that we should be doing something on this case. 
2 I'm not quite sure the motion is proper but let's not 
3 object to that, let's do something to, to try to settle 
4 this. 
5 THE JUDGE: Well, one of my questions is, this 
6 was already appealed once, affirmed once. And what I want 
7 to ask you is if you believe that the court has the option 
8 of just declining to hear, consider the motion at this 
9 point. 
10 MR. POMEROY: At the time the motion was filed, 
11 the notice to submit was filed I had no basis to say that. 
12 In further review I honestly don't think the court has 
13 jurisdiction to continue because of how it went up on appeal 
14 and is back down now on what I see as a new motion or a 
15 motion renewing the same motion from before. I don't see 
16 the basis for that. 
17 I do think it should go to the board of pardons 
18 and if they ask for clarification the Court can do something 
19 at that point. 
20 That being said I realize there's a high 
21 likelihood that the Court will proceed. And I'd be okay 
22 with that because I do think that there actually is a 
23 problem with Judge Laycock's order. I think she actually 
24 muddied the waters in a way that took away from some 
25 clarity that was in Judge Schofield's oral order. And I'll 
13 
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1 get to the problem between the oral and the written in a 
2 second. 
3 However, I want to state first that I disagree 
4 with the defense's reading of the statute. I see nothing 
5 in the statute that requires the sequential determination. 
6 It says and, it just says the court has to do both. And 
7 the court did fail to do the step of considering within the 
8 case but they didn't fail to do the step of considering the 
9 charges within the case to the prior case. And I think 
10 that's important, it doesn't have to be sequential because 
11 if it's not sequential the proper reading can be inferred 
12 grammatically from what Judge Schofield said. 
13 And I think the court is correct in that when the 
14 court said, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Count 1 in the matter run concurrent 
to the other time you're serving and 
that Count 2 run consecutive so that you 
will have one concurrent and one 
19 consecutive sentence. 
20 This is very clearly inferential even though 
21 it's not explicit that Count 1 runs concurrent to the 
22 St. George case and Count 2 runs consecutive to the 
23 St. George case. 
24 The problem comes in when the written order 
25 accidentally flipped those two, and that was a clerical 
14 
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1 error. That the written order wrote the opposite that 
2 Count 2 was to run concurrent and Count 1 to run 
3 consecutive. And so that was the error that needed to be 
4 fixed clerically. 
5 And then the court did need to fix the error of 
6 not explicitly stating, as the statute indicates the court 
7 needs to do, whether Count 1 and Count 2 should run 
8 concurrently or consecutive. 
9 It is clearly inferred from the court's order 
10 what it appears the board of pardons has inferred that if 
11 Count 1 runs concurrent to the St. George case and Count 2 
12 runs consecutive to the St. George case then the (short 
13 indecipherable} that even defense counsel mentioned that 
14 Count 1 runs, or Count 2 runs consecutive to Count 1. 
15 There can be no other way. 
16 And soi: the court were to look at the diagrams, 
17 sorry, Your Honor, scrolling down to that really quick. 
18 Diagram 1 where the defense counsel puts Count 2 kind of 
19 floating above out there and consecutive to what, well, I 
20 think that is clearly inferred from what Judge Schofield is 
21 intending to say that it's consecutive to the St. George 
22 case. 
23 So Count 2, I 1 m sorry, diagram 2 which I think 
24 accurately diagrams the written order, well, the only 
25 problem with the written order is that we need to switch 
15 
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1 Count 1 and Count 2 and then that diagram would accurately 
2 depict what Judge Schofield intended, as long as the 
3 court articulates that Count 2 is to run consecutive to 
4 Count 1, that fixed the problem with the illegal sentence 
5 in violation of the statute that the court needs to say 
6 that. 
7 And that's apparently what the board of pardons 
8 has understood from this, and I think that's the easiest 
9 way or the most direct way, and honestly the best way to 
10 put intent to Judge Schofield's written order. 
11 And I'm now going to come back to what I said 
12 the beginning is the effect of Judge Laycock's order. 
13 I've been trying to find any research to see whether 
14 Judge Laycock's modification where she says that she 
15 believes that Count 1 and Count 2 are supposed to be 
at 
16 concurrent, whether that has any bearing on what the court 
17 can do or must do today. And I have found nothing to 
18 suggest that the court is now bound by Judge Laycock's 
19 later interpretation of Judge Schofield's order. I don't 
20 think that the court is, so the court can kind of ignore 
21 what Judge Laycock did if the court is going to address 
22 the merits, go back to what Schofield intended, and that 
23 would be diagram 2, but switching Count 1 and Count 2 in 
24 that diagram, and Count 1 is concurrent to the St. George 
25 case and Count 2 is consecutive to both the St. George 
16 
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1 case and Count 1. And I think that adequately resolves the 
2 matter. 
3 I hope that was clear, Your Honor. I apologize if 
4 there was any inclarity. 
5 THE JUDGE: It's very helpful actually I think, 
6 Mr. Pomeroy. The only question is if Judge Laycock's 
7 hearing resulted in a resentencing, then procedurally isn't 
8 the defendant here on Judge Laycock's sentencing order? 
9 MR. POMEROY: That, that may be true. But the 
10 way I look at this, Your Honor, is if we're here to 
11 reconsidering Judge Laycock's sentencing order we have to 
12 look at whether Judge Laycock's sentencing order is valid. 
13 And to me her order is even worse than Judge Schofield's 
14 and so we pretty much have to toss hers and go back to what 
15 should have been done in this case. And if we're going 
16 back to what should have been, should have been done I think 
17 it's what Judge Schofield said but not what was written, and 
18 we just make explicit what was inferred. 
19 
20 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. I might come back to you. 
I have a question for you, Mr. Thompson. Your 
21 motion argues that Judge Schofield's sentencing order was 
22 incorrect. Judge Laycock's sentencing order has already 
23 been affirmed. And so really I guess procedurally this is a 
24 hard question I think for both sides. 
25 MR. THOMPSON: I think I can clarify. 
17 
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1 THE JUDGE: It 1 s a hard question for the state and 
2 for you. 
3 
4 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. THOMPSON 
MR. THOMPSON: From the appellate perspective 
5 what happened was is the court found, they didn't affirm the, 
6 the Court of Appeals didn 1 t affirm the sentencing, they 
7 didn't reach the merits of the case. What they found was 
8 that he hadn 1 t filed his notice of appeal on time. So they 
9 didn 1 t, they actually did not discuss whether or not this 
10 was an illegal sentence or if she had made a mistake in her, 
11 in her correction. 
12 The, the only thing they said was that he had 
13 filed his notice of appeal late so they were dismissing the 
14 case. 
15 THE JUDGE: So he 1 s refiled the motion. 
16 MR. THOMPSON: Excuse me? 
17 THE JUDGE: So he's refiled the motion I guess, 
18 he's just filed a new motion. What is his motion attacking? 
19 MR. THOMPSON: It's her, it I s her, it I s the 
20 existing order. 
21 And, and I understand that we are in murky 
22 jurisdictional waters here. But as I read the rule that 
23 allows a person to file a motion to correct an illegal 
24 sentence, an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time. 
25 The fact that Judge Laycock didn't think that her, her 
18 
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1 motion, her order was illegal doesn't change the fact that 
2 it is illegal and that this court has jurisdiction to correct 
3 an illegal sentence at any time. 
4 THE JUDGE: Yes. But when is it res judicata, 
5 when is it done if--
6 MR. THOMPSON: My interpretation of the rule is 
7 that it's only res judicata when it's no longer illegal. 
8 An illegal sentence can be corrected at any time. 
9 And there's a good reason for that, Judge. 
10 Illegal sentences can't, we can't, as a system we can't 
11 afford to allow them to just sit out there and say well, 
12 you've had due process, tough luck. You had a couple of 
13 judges who didn't like you and, and they ruled against you 
14 so you're going to continue to serve an illegal sentence. 
15 THE JUDGE: Judge Laycock ruled for him but in a 
16 way that, that you're now using--
17 MR. THOMPSON: She, she definitely did not 
18 rule for him. She didn't grant the request that he asked. 
19 THE JUDGE: But she granted a concurrently that 
20 maybe he wasn't entitled, that really he wasn't entitled 
21 to. 
22 MR. THOMPSON: Well, that very well may be 
23 true. I'm not suggesting or supporting her, her decision. 
24 And neither was he. I mean, it was within few days he was 
25 asking the judge to review it again. He walked out of the 
19 
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1 courtroom thinking what just happened. How did, how did 
2 she get to where she got based on my motion? And he did 
3 ask her to review it right away. The problem was that he 
4 didn't file his notice of appeal on time. Not that he 
5 wasn't asking her to, to fix the problem that she had made. 
6 That did occur almost immediately. 
7 This is a prose defendant and within few days he 
8 had written another letter saying Judge, you've messed this 
9 up, I don't how you did, you know, you did that but this, 
10 this isn't the proper correction to the sentence. And when 
11 she declined to review it again he did file a notice of 
12 appeal, it just wasn't within the 30 days so the, the Court 
13 of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
14 But, but I don't think the traditional notion of 
15 res judicata can a, can deprive this court of jurisdiction 
16 over a sentence that is, I think both parties agree that at 
17 this point the sentence is illegal. 
THE JUDGE: No. 18 
19 MR. THOMPSON: Well, I'm not suggesting the court 
20 agrees, but I think the state agrees that the sentence is 
21 illegal. 
22 THE JUDGE: The state concedes that 
23 Judge Laycock's sentence isn't necessarily illegal but it 
24 doesn't make any sense. 
25 MR. THOMPSON: Well, under the definition of an 
20 
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1 illegal sentence, if it doesn't make any sense, if it is 
2 internally contradictory then it is illegal. 
3 THE JUDGE: I'll just tell you the court 
4 disagrees with your reading of the statute. I think what 
5 you're reading of the statute is is the way everybody does 
6 it because it just makes the most sense to do it that way. 
7 This is the way this court had the done it, every judge I've 
8 ever seen has done it the way you suggest it ought to be 
9 done, that's true. But just because one judge somewhere 
10 did it differently doesn't mean it was an illegal sentence 
11 and so the court disagrees that Judge Schofield's sentence 
12 was an illegal sentence. 
MR. THOMPSON: Okay. 13 
14 THE JUDGE: So I'm trying to figure out what to do 
15 about that. 
16 
17 
MR. THOMPSON: 
THE JUDGE: 
Well a--
As far as back to Judge Schofield's 
18 sentence if the court feels that Judge Schofield's sentence 
19 is not illegal, just unusual, then, then what? 
20 MR. THOMPSON: I've got to make sure that I'm 
21 clear here. The motion today that's before this court is 
22 that Judge Laycock's sentence is illegal. I believe the 
23 appropriate remedy is to, to address that sentence by 
24 examining what was, what was ordered by Judge Schofield. 
25 If the court is inclined to reinstate 
21 
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1 Judge Schofield's initial order as you stated it, that 
2 would be the court's prerogative. But we're not asking 
3 you to determine whether or not Judge Schofield's initial 
4 order, I mean, we claim that it was illegal but we're not 
5 asking you to review that as illegal. 
6 We're asking you to review Judge Laycock's order as 
7 to whether or not it's illegal. 
8 THE JUDGE: So an order setting aside 
9 Judge Laycock 1 s order and reinstating Judge Schofield's. 
10 MR. THOMPSON: Certainly wouldn't be what we're 
11 asking you to do, Judge, but that's, that's within your 
12 power. We would say that would be illegal too. 
13 The position we've taken is that both of these 
14 sentencing orders are illegal. But the only one that is 
15 at stake before the court today is Laycock's. And we have 
16 referenced Judge Schofield's order, made mention of it 
17 because we're trying to, well, his oral order is we're 
18 trying to help you make sense of what was issued so that 
19 you can create a legal order, a legal sentence that is 
20 consistent with what Judge Schofield said. 
21 THE JUDGE: I want to come back to you, 
22 Mr. Pomeroy. Has the state done the math? 
23 MR. POMEROY: The math? No Your Honor, I have 
24 not. 
25 THE JUDGE: And you don't know which category he 
22 
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1 fell in? Maybe if I pull up his old sentencing. 
2 know why I can't pull up the PSI? 
Do you 
3 MR. THOMPSON: It's old, Judge. This is a very 
4 old case. 
5 
6 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. THOMPSON: 
Have you done the math, Mr. --
I 1 m sorry. I 1 m not sure 
7 exactly what math you're referring to. But how much time 
8 he's supposed to be doing, is that--
9 THE JUDGE: Yes. I'm wondering if Mr. Mulliner 
10 knows what the difference is if, if the two, thirds are 
11 consecutive to each other and then concurrent with the other 
12 case. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I do know the answer to that, 
14 Your Honor. 
15 THE JUDGE: Yes. Do you want to tell me what it 
16 is? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: From the board's perspective it 
18 is exactly the same. If they were to calculate, now, from 
19 a matrix, from a sentence recommendation standpoint if you 
.20 run Count 2 consecutive to Count 1 and that 0-to-10 
21 running concurrent with the 1-to-15, that has the same 
22 resulting matrix or sentencing recommendation as running 
23 Count 2 consecutive to St. George. The only difference 
24 is the maximum sentence statutorily, of course, is five 
25 years. 
23 
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1 
2 
MR. THOMPSON: 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Five years longer. 
But from the, from the board's 
3 point of view when they calculate a .matrix or a sentencing 
4 recommendation, those two sentences result in exactly the 
5 same number of months recommended for prison. They both add 
6 a 40% add-on to the original 0-to-5 recommendation. 
7 MR. THOMPSON: And Judge, this is a point that 
8 I wanted to make that I overlooked. That when we look at 
9 the sentencing order from Judge Schofield and he says I 
10 want to make sure there's a modicum of accountability. 
11 Running Count 1 and 2 consecutive to each other and 
12 concurrent with the other case does create a modicum of 
13 accountability between Count 1 and Count 2. That's, that 
14 I think does account for what he's looking for in a, in the 
15 sentencing order. 
16 But, and Mr. Mulliner has made this point in his 
17 own writings. When it is interpreted this other way, when 
18 Count a, 2 is run consecutive to the St. George case and, 
19 and no, no explicit relationship to Count 1, it creates more 
20 than a modicum, it creates at least the 40% and add a 
21 possible five more additional years. And that is a very 
22 significant difference. And that doesn't seem to be 
23 supported by the language in the sentencing order. 
24 I'm glad you brought that up because that was a 
25 point that I just glossed over. 
24 
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1 THE JUDGE: Yes. I was focusing on the a, the 
2 matrix time and I couldn't see a difference mathematically 
3 so--
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct. 4 
5 THE JUDGE: But I wasn't thinking at the top. 
6 And so thank you for pointing that out to me. 
7 Okay. Final requests from the state. Do you 
8 have any position on any of that? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. POMEROY 9 
10 MR. POMEROY: Your Honor, the state is in a 
11 tough position here and let me explain why. 
12 ways that the state could proceed on this. 
There's two 
13 Option one is that there was a motion, okay, so 
14 Judge Schofield's order which was reconsidered by 
15 Judge Laycock, Judge Laycock gave an order, a motion that 
16 was essentially a motion to reconsider was filed, it was 
17 denied by Judge Laycock, that was appealed. The appellate 
18 court said for procedural reasons I'm sorry but you screwed 
19 it up, it's sent back down to the district court. 
20 This motion is essentially a motion to 
21 reconsideration what was already denied. And so I do 
22 think the principles of res judicata should bar hearing it. 
23 Properly the way to handle this would be to file a motion 
24 with the Court of Appeals to reinstate the appellate time. 
25 I'm not saying that would work, I'm just saying that that's 
25 
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1 properly the procedure that should have been followed. 
2 So on the one hand I should be looking at this and 
3 saying court, don't do anything, law of the case, we're done 
4 here. But I'm also in the bind and in the position of I do 
5 think that Judge Laycock's order gave the defendant a 
6 concurrence to which he was not entitled. And so if I'm 
7 silent and say, you know, court, you can hear this case, then 
8 I get to argue for a better sentence from the state's 
9 perspective. 
10 And that's a really tough position. Do I want to 
11 say to the defendant I'm sorry, you're just going to have to 
12 deal with Judge Laycock's order, which even I don't like. 
13 Or do I say to the defendant yes, let's hear that even 
14 though we shouldn't be hearing that. And I want you to have 
15 the worst sentence, I want you to have Judge Schofield's 
16 sentence. And so I do think that puts the state in a tough 
17 position that to balance public safety as well as by right 
18 protecting the defendant's constitutional interest in this 
19 case. 
20 And so I'm going to leave it there, Your Honor. 
21 I honestly do believe that res judicata would bar the 
22 hearing on this claim. That being said, if the court 
23 proceeds today I do agree that Judge Laycock's sentence was 
24 improper, at least not in the illegal sense but it was not 
25 the proper sentence to be given. And so if we're going to 
26 
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1 consider that we need to go back to Judge Schofield's 
2 original intent which was Count 1 runs concurrent to the 
3 St. George case, Count 2 runs consecutive to both Count 1 
4 and the St. George case. 
5 
6 
Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Do you know any of the facts of this 
7 case, you know, ( short indecipherable) . 
8 MR. POMEROY: I don't have access to that file so 
9 I don't, Your Honor. 
10 THE JUDGE: Mr. Thompson. 
11 MR. THOMPSON: Just one point about the 
12 jurisdiction, Judge. 
13 THE JUDGE: Well, the facts of the case first. 
14 Do you know, do you know any facts, do you know if this was 
15 a several thousand dollar case, if this is several million 
16 dollar case? 
17 MR. THOMPSON: Several thousand. I think the 
18 recitation was $2,000, something like that as I read in 
19 the--
20 THE DEFENDANT: It was a bounced check for 2,900. 
21 It was a bounced check for 20, whatever that restitution 
22 number is, $2,975 I believe. 
23 THE JUDGE: No, it's a sale of unregistered 
24 security and securities fraud. That's not a bounced check 
25 case. 
27 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Well, but it became, it started as 
2 a bounced check and that became what it ended up because it 
3 was involved with a payroll company and so somehow it became 
4 a security issue. 
5 THE JUDGE: I don't even know the restitution 
6 amount. Is the total restitution in this case $2,000? 
7 MR. THOMPSON: $2,975. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: That's the correct and total 
9 restitution at the time. ~ 
10 THE JUDGE: How much was the other case that 
11 you're doing prison time on? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Much more than that, about 
13 $90,000. 
14 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I want to. 
15 THE JUDGE: Go ahead. 
16 MR. THOMPSON: I just want to be careful about 
17 the fact that we're not resentencing him based on--
18 THE JUDGE: I totally understand. But I'm not 
19 the sentencing judge and so I've got to get up to speed as 
20 much as possible going on your procedural issues. 
21 MR. THOMPSON: The way the state has 
22 characterized the process is correct. The, the Court of 
23 Appeals dismissed this on procedural grounds. And they 
24 characterized his request, his second request of 
25 Judge Laycock as basically a motion to reconsider, which is 
28 
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1 what Judge Laycock characterized it as. 
2 And under normal circumstances I think the state 
3 might be right that, that this would be, you know, like a 
4 third bite at the apple and res judicata might apply. 
5 But I think the rule under which illegal 
6 sentences can be corrected at any time changes the dynamic. 
7 And as I said, as uncomfortable as it may make everyone feel 
8 I think you can file a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
9 and the court will have jurisdiction to hear it a hundred 
10 times, a million times. There's no stopping claims that an 
11 illegal sentence is illegal, if it is legitimately illegal. 
12 And that's, that might be an uncomfortable position to 
13 accept but I think that's what the rule provides for because 
14 of how the court, the Supreme Court in making it (short 
15 indecipherable} function feels about illegal sentences. 
16 And, and that would a change this review about, about a, the 
17 court's jurisdiction. 
18 There are a couple of rules where this applies, the 
19 illegal sentencing rule and a, the motion to reinstate time 
20 to appeal. Both of those include this at any time language 
21 and they don't really, that language doesn't pop up very many 
22 places but it does in those two spots. 
23 Now, that doesn't mean that every time someone 
24 files a motion correcting an illegal sentence he's going to 
25 win. 
29 
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1 
2 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. THOMPSON: 
Or it has to be heard? 
I think it has to be heard. I 
3 think the court has to say there's no validity to the 
4 motion. I think it can be raised at any time granting the 
5 court jurisdiction. If the court has jurisdiction it has to 
6 rule on the motion. I don't think the court can just 
7 decline and say well, I've already thought about this I'm not 
8 going to do anything. 
9 THE JUDGE: So someone could filed a motion every 
10 week? 
11 MR. THOMPSON: And the court would, in cases, 
12 in extreme cases like this where it was clear that the, the 
13 motion wasn't illegal, I think the court can write a one 
14 sentence that says this is not illegal. That's going to be 
15 sufficient. But I think the court is going to rule on a 
16 motion that it has jurisdiction over. 
17 And I, and I know why that feels uncomfortable. 
18 But the opposite is true too, and it's true in 
19 this case. We have a sentence, Judge Laycock's sentence is 
20 clearly illegal. It is illegal by the terms set by the 
21 Supreme Court about what an illegal sentence is. 
22 internally contradictory. 
It's 
23 THE JUDGE: It's internally contradictory because 
24 Count 1 and Count 2 are concurrent with each other but one of 
25 the Counts is consecutive with the other case. 
30 
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1 
2 
3 
MR. THOMPSON: That's exactly right. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's running twice. 
THE JUDGE: I think that the court will take it 
4 under advisement and issue a written ruling on it. 
Appreciate your time. 5 
6 
7 
MR. THOMPSON: Very good. Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Appreciate your help. Nice to meet 
8 you, "r. Mulliner. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's my pleasure. 
THE JUDGE: Have a good day. 
9 
10 
11 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded. 
13 =====================-
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10 and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full, 
11 true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded 
12 and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
13 1 through 31, inclusive, including where it is indicated that 
14 the recording was inaudible. 
15 I further certify that I am not of kin nor otherwise 
16 associated with any of the parties to this cause of action 
17 and am not interested in the event thereof. 
18 WITNESS my hand and official seal this 12th day of 
19 August, 2017. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PENNY C. ABBOTT 
Notary Puc,l,c. Su•t"O ol Utah 
Coff"lrni11el0n # 69 l ~ 1 a 
--4~~~¼•~ My Con,rTtli$5lon E·1<ptroo On 
Sttotombo:• 28, 2:020 
PENNY C. TT, COURT REPORTER/NO'rAR: 
L~canse 22-102811-7801 
Notary Pub1~c, comm Exp 9-28-2020 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
License 22-102811-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-28-20 
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